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COMMENTS
ADJACENT AIRSPACE IN THE LAW OF
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Cuicunque Aliquid Conceditur, Conceditur Etiam et Id Sine
Quo Res ipsa Non Esse Potuit*
Whether a tenant's right to space extends beyond the exterior of the
walls bounding the premises demised must appear at first glance, even to
the serious student of the laW of landlord and tenant, a purely academic
query. Even to raise the question may strike some as foolhardy since the
field is already heavily laden with technical, indeed, hypertechnical concepts. But the question no longer may be regarded as one wholly within
the realm of scholarly speculation. Like many recent vexations of the law
it is a child of the material inventiveness and creativity of the twentieth
century. In eras blessed with fewer gadgets, the tenant's right might
safely be assumed to stop at the exterior of the walls, though there were
some who doubted this at a time comparatively recent in the development
of this phase of the law.1
With the cornucopia of science issuing forth a steady stream of new
contrivances and devices, it has become commonplace to find a new legal
problem created by nearly every invention. The television antenna, a
fixture of the American landscape, has been a fruitful source of litigation.
How far an air-conditioner may protrude into the airspace outside the
tenant's window has been before the courts. The right to hang signs, or
restrict them, has always been a problem, but one resolved on the basis of
possession of the wall, and without a consideration of conflicting claims
to adjacent or contiguous airspace.
Rather than wait for science to spring new surprises, and hence problems, it may be well to consider the question of the tenant's rights to
adjacent airspace in advance. This in itself may seem revolutionary in a
system of law slavishly addicted to solution by precedent. But the lack
of cases in point must not deter the search for the answer to a problem
destined to provide litigation in ensuing years. In assessing the problem,
perhaps it would do well to bear in mind Holmes' observation:
Every important principle which is developed by litigation is in fact and at
bottom the result of more or less definitely understood views of public policy;
most generally, to be sure, under our practice and traditions, the unconscious
Shep. Touch. 89.
See arguments of plaintiff's counsel in Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 503, 16 Am. Rep.
688 (1873).
1
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result of instinctive preferences and inarticulate convictions, but none the less
2
traceable to views of public policy in the last analysis.
THE SIGN OR WALL EXTERIOR CASES

Notwithstanding the dearth of cases in point as to the right to adjacent
airspace, the landlord and tenant relationship has given rise to one problem that literally ends where the immediate problem begins. The problem, distilled to its essentials, is whether the tenant, without agreement
one way or the other, has the possession and right to use the exterior of
the walls bounding the premises leased. An unbroken current of authority, both in the United States and England, holds that he does. A brief
examination of the cases so holding is in order in that it is here that important clues exist indicating which way the courts will hold when ultimately they decide who has the right of enjoyment and possession of
adjacent airspace outside the walls of the tenant's premises.
In the leading case of Riddle v. Littlefield, it was squarely held that the
tenant, "by the terms of the lease of 'a certain store,' acquired the right
to the use and occupation of the outside of the walls belonging to that
portion of the tenement which included the store."a The court went on
to point out that the tenant took the outside walls as a "parcel of the
demised premises proper, and not as a thing technically appurtenant
thereto. The outside wall of a building leased or conveyed passes by the
'4
lease or deed as much as the inside of the same wall." Quoting with ap5
proval from a recognized authority, the court held that "whatever easements and privileges legally appertain to property pass by a conveyance
of the property itself, without any additional words. The grant of a thing
passes the incident as well as the principal, though the latter only is men6
tioned; and this effect cannot be voided without an express reservation."
The court added:
A grant of a thing will include whatever the grantor had power to convey,
which is reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the thing granted .... If a
house or a store be conveyed, everything which belongs to it or is in use with
it, and whatever is essential to the enjoyment passes as an incident, unless specially reserved. Whenever anything is granted, all the means to attain it, and all
the fruits and effects of it are also granted, and will pass inclusive .... 7
Fourteen years later, an English court indicated its agreement with the
s
Riddle case, citing it by name and approving its rationale. The contro2Holmes, The Common Law, Lec. 1,35 (1881).
8 53 N.H. 503, 509, 16 Am. Rep. 688 (1873).

4Ibid.

5 Smith and Soden, Landlord and Tenant, 86-88.
6 Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 503, 509, 16 Am. Rep. 688 (1873).

7Ibid.
8Carlisle Cafe Co. v. Muse, 77 L.T. (Eng.) 515, 46 W.R. 107, 67 L. J. Ch. 53 (1897).
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versy in the English case arose, as has so often been the case, over the
right to hang signs. Defendant tenants leased the premises relying upon
representations that they would have the right to use the outer walls for
the purpose of advertising their business. Plaintiff, also a tenant, erected a
sign that covered by some two and a half feet, the lower portion of the
outer wall of the defendants' story. Defendant tenants of the upper floor,
evidently inclined to seek summary relief, tore down the sign below,
whereupon a suit was brought for an injunction to restrain the defendants
from removing the sign or erecting one of their own. In defense, the
Riddle case was urged upon the court as authority for the proposition
that a tenant has the right to use both the outside and inside of the walls
bounding the space he rents. The High Court of Justice, Chancery division, concurred with defendants' position, holding through Byrne, J.:
The premises let ...

constitute a little dwelling by itself .... It is said on be-

half of the plaintiff, that the letting did not include the outer walls of the house.

I think that it did include them, so far as they were solely appropriate to the

rooms let .... If, then, the defendants had a right to use the outer walls at all,

they had a right to use them in the way they have done. I think they had that
right, and that the signboard put up by the plaintiff was in derogation of that
right.9

Similarly, the Massachusetts courts have repeatedly held that the tenant
is not restricted to the inside of the walls bounding the space rented.
In Lowell v. Strahan, the court said there is no reason the landlord should
be regarded as having one set of rights on the outside of the wall and
quite a different set on the inside.10 The court defined the rights of the
landlord, stating that where he retains control of an upper tenement, he
has the right in the whole wall for support, but that otherwise the tenant
retains control and has the right to give a license to affix a sign to the
wall to another without breaching a covenant against "underletting,""'
In a Massachusetts case of more recent vintage, where a landlord
sought to enjoin the maintenance of a sign by the lessee, the court refused
to grant relief even though the lease provided for the necessity of the
lessor's permission before any sign could be erected. 12 It was held that
the landlord was estopped to deny the lessee's right to hang the sign since
it had hung on the wall for some two and one half years, pursuant to the
landlord's oral permission. The court restated what has been a recurrent
theme in the cases:
Ibid., at 516.
10 145 Mass. 1, 12 N.E. 401 (1887).

11 Ibid., at 405.
12 Levin v. Rose, 302 Mass. 378, 19 N.E. 2d 297 (1939).
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A lease, unless otherwise providing, includes the control of the outside walls
adjacent to the demised premises with the incidental right to such walls for
Is
such purposes as they are usually and ordinarily employed ....
A similar statement was made where it was held, in denying relief in
a tort action against the landlord, that an awning overhanging the store
of a lessee was not shown to be in control of the landlord who occupied
the floor above the demised premises, merely because the awning was
attached to the outside of the wall. 14 Blanchard v. Stones, Inc., another
Massachusetts tort decision, held that where plaintiff was injured on a
sidewalk as the result of ice formed thereon from water dripping from
a sign hung by lessees, the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show
that the sign was under the lessor's control.' 5 The court noted:
The fact that it was entirely, or almost entirely, located above the store
premises is not enough to fasten liability upon the defendant [lessor]. There is
nothing in the record to indicate that the portion of the exterior wall to which
the sign was attached was in the control of the owner rather than in that of the
tenants upon the second floor. Ordinarily, the control of such portion of this wall
the premises
would be in the tenants of the second floor, who were occupying
16
adjacent to the wall, in the absence of anything to the contrary.
And, in a relatively recent decision, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts affirmed an injunction preventing a first floor tenant from
building a mere fifteen
erecting a sign that extended on the wall of the
17
inches above the floor level of the second floor.
8
The Riddle case has received recognition in other jurisdictions.'
Forbes v. Gorman, a frequently cited Michigan decision, held that the
lease of a building, or of one floor or story thereof, conveys to the lessee
"absolute dominion over the premises leased, including the outer as well
as the inner walls."' 9 It was said that the tenant acquired the right to use
the walls for all purposes not inconsistent with the lease. Hilburn v.
Huntsman, a Kentucky decision, affirmed denial of relief to a ground
floor tenant stating that although a lintel upon which a sign was attached
hung slightly below the tenant's ceiling line, there was no showing that
the sign itself extended below the ceiling. 20 The court noted however:
The principles of law governing a case of this kind are well settled. In the absence of a contrary provision in the lease, the lessee has the exclusive right to the
1 Ibid., at 298. Note also 265 Tremont Street, Inc. v. Hamilburg, 321 Mass. 353, 73
N.E. 2d 828 (1947).
14 Hannon v. Schwartz, 304 Mass. 468, 23 N.E. 2d 1022 (1939).
15 304 Mass. 634, 24 N.E. 2d 688 (1939).
16 Ibid., at 691.
17 265 Tremont Street, Inc. v. Hamilburg, 321 Mass. 353, 73 N.E. 2d 828 (1947).
IsRiddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 503, 16 Am. Rep. 688 (1873).
19 159 Mich. 291,123 N.W.1089, 1090 (1909).
20 187 Ky. 701, 220 S.W. 528 (1920).
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use of the outside walls of the portion of the building covered by his lease, for
advertising purposes, to the exclusion of a lessee of another part of the same
21
building.
In Smith v. Jensen, the Supreme Court of Georgia ruled that in the
absence of an express provision to the contrary, the lease of a building,
"or a portion thereof," for business purposes, gives the lessee "the exclusive right to the use of the outside walls of that portion of the building
embraced in his lease for advertising purposes. ' 22 The court held that
where there are different tenants of several floors of a building, a tenant
on one floor has no right to prevent a tenant on another floor from
placing signs upon the walls outside the other tenant's story. In a 1951
decision, the Rhode Island Supreme court restated the rule,23 and the
24
court of last resort in North Dakota has taken a similar position.
Illinois apparently has adopted the doctrine of the Riddle case. In 400
North Rush, Inc. v. D. ]. Bielzoff Products Co., plaintiff lessor brought
an action against lessee under the state forcible entry and detainer act
to oust the defendant from possession of a wall upon which the defendant
had painted a sign. 25 Holding that the action could not be maintained,
the court said that authorities in other states hold that "the exterior walls
of leased premises are part and parcel of the demise to the lessee; and if
that be the rule (as we think it is), there could have been no trespass. .... -26 In a subsequent case, the same Illinois Appellate court was
called on to decide whether plaintiff lessee of two floors of a building
could maintain an action of forcible entry and detainer to recover possession of the exterior surface of the walls of the floors which it had
rented.27 Defendants contended that the sign which they had painted on
the walls was there by virtue of a license from the landlord, and that as
mere licensees, the action of forcible entry and detainer, being in nature
possessory, could not be maintained against them. Holding that the action
could be maintained, the court said:
Defendants' claimed rights as licensee were with plaintiff's lessor, who it was
determined... had no right to enter into the agreement. Defendants by painting
a sign advertising a product of one of plaintiff's competitors on the outside wall
of the building disseized plaintiff from its paramount right of possession to its

portion of such wall. As long as defendants' sign remained, plaintiff 28was disseized and deprived of the possession to which it was lawfully entitled.
21 Ibid.
22 156 Ga. 814, 120 S.E. 417, 419 (1923).
23
Moretti v. C. S. Realty Co., 78 R.I. 341, 82 A. 2d 608 (1951).
24 Platou v. Swanton, 59 N.D. 466, 230 N.W. 725 (1930). See also Kratovil, Real Estate
Law S654 (2d ed., 1952).
25 347 l. App. 123, 106 N.E. 2d 208 (1952).
28 Ibid., at 210.
27 D. J. Bielzoff Products Co. v. James B. Bean Distilling Co., 3 111. App. 2d 530, 123
N.E. 2d 135 (1954).
28 Ibid., at 137.
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A Massachusetts decision defines in some detail the limits of the tenant's
spatial rights.2 9 The case involved an action in contract to recover the

expenses of replacing a plate glass window broken by a third person,
the window forming a part of the outer wall of the plaintiff's office.
The lessee plaintiff was specifically forbidden to affix or paint any sign
on the outside of the building. In holding that the lessor was under no
obligation to replace the window, the court opined:
It is manifest that the tenant of a room possesses the incidental right to use and
decorate the interior walls, floor and ceiling in accordance with his own taste
and needs so long as he does no harm to them. His lease covers not merely the
cubical space bounded by the inner planes of walls, floor and ceiling. Such a
tenancy implies the right to attach carpets or rugs to the floor....

Painting and

papering are within the natural uses by the tenant of a room. These factors lead
to the conclusion that, prima facie and in the absence of agreement, the lease in
the case at bar included the whole of the plate glass window .... 0

Most of the foregoing cases were concerned with relatively small
buildings in which the competitive interests of several tenants were not
in conflict. But there have been at least two cases considering the effect
of a number of tenants in a single building on the general doctrine. In
Emmons v. D. A. Schulte, Inc., 1 the court held that putting advertising
signs on an office building did not constitute waste, the Chancellor
saying:
If it be legally sound to accord to the tenant of a floor or story of a building
the exclusive use of the outside walls for advertising purposes, and the authorities
clearly hold that it is, then there is no logical escape from the conclusion that a
3
room or rooms should be accorded a similar right.

2

But in Fuller v. Rose, where tenants were denied the right by the court
to use the walls for advertising purposes although they could use the windows, it was held that tenants could not, in the absence of a showing of
injury to their business, restrain the landlord from painting advertisements on the walls.aa Conceding on the one hand that the lessee of an
entire building acquires the right to use both sides of the wall, the court
maintained that the presence of a number of tenants in a single building
restricts the extent of the devise to each, and the rights and privileges
incident thereto. The court observed:
The right of all must be so curtailed that they will not interfere with each
other. In this building all of the tenants possessed the right to support and in29 Leominster Fuel Co. v. Scanlon, 243 Mass. 126, 137 N.E. 271 (1922).
30 Ibid., at 272. (italics added) The court cited as authority for its holding two English decisions: Hope Brothers, Ltd. v. Cowan, 2 Ch. 312 (1913); Goldfoot v. Welch,
I Ch. 213 (1914).
8113 Del. Ch. 336, 120 At. 221 (1923).
81Ibid., at 226.
3 110 Mo. App. 344, 85 S.W. 931 (1905).
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closure of the south wall including the part thereof claimed by the plaintiffs. It
would lead to absurd conclusions to say that any tenant was vested with title to
any portion of the outer walls. The title to them remained in the owner of the
building, whose duty itwas to maintain them for the benefit of all the occupants.
34
It has been said by some authorities that tenants in buildings of this character,
whose rooms are inclosed by an outer wall, have the right to use such portion of
the exterior thereof for the placing thereon of their signs; but such right is a
privilege acquired from ... custom-a mere incident to, not a parcel of, the demised premises, and consequently not derived from title. The landlord may deprive his tenants of such privilege by stipulations in the lease, in which case, the
ownership of the walls remaining in him, he may use their outside surfaces for
purposes of revenue.3 5
The court cautioned that the landlord is required not to inflict damages
upon the tenant upon his covenant to give the tenant uninterrupted and
peaceable possession of the respective premises and therefore the landlord
could not erect signs which would injure the business of any of the tenants. It was said that the court would not take cognizance of "aesthetics"
36
and that "[olffended taste will not support a cause of action."
The foregoing decision, qualifying the right of the tenant to the exterior of the wall almost to destroying it, is curious for a number of
reasons. Most of the courts that have considered the problem seem to be
influenced by what was no doubt an ingenious argument of counsel in
the Riddle case, to the effect that if the landlord retained control of the
wall space outside the premises demised to the tenant, the landlord could
rent the space to a competitor which could put the tenant out of business.37 The Missouri court collided head on with the same proposition
but chose to approach the problem from a different direction, holding
that the landlord retained ownership of the wall, but could run no advertisements harmful to the business of the tenants. This solution enabled the
court to back out of what would otherwise have been equitably a deadend street, but the rationale of the case lacks the38semblance of symmetry
intrinsic in the doctrine of Riddle v. Littlefield.
An undercurrent of controversy in the wall or sign cases has revolved
around acts of the tenant in using the exterior of the wall, involving possibility of waste or damage to the landlord's reversionary interest. Because of the varying factual situations, it is difficult in the extreme to
fashion any sort of general definition as to what constitutes waste in this
34 The building in the instant case was seven stories, had 100 rooms and 50 tenants.
35 110 Mo. App. 344, 85 S.W. 931, 932 (1905).
3

6Ibid.

37

See argument of defense counsel in Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 503, 507, 16 Am.

Rep.688 (1873).
38 The possibility that a tenant might be eliminated from the market was of course
not the only string in the bow of the New Hampshire court.
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regard. An examination of a few decisions will suffice for purposes of
the question at hand.
In Bee Building Co. v. Peters Trust Co., the issue was whether the lessee of a building had the right to abandon or change the name of the
building, and in doing so, to partially dismantle a parapet wall for that
purpose.3 9 Quoting with approval from a leading text writer, the court
said that a lease of part of a building prima facie passes the outer walls
adjacent to the rooms or apartment named as a part of the premises
leased, and consequently the lessee has the exclusive right to use such wall
40
for advertising purposes.

In holding that the lessee had the right to partially dismantle and rebuild the parapet wall which held the old name of the building, the court
reasoned that no damage was done to the freehold since it was shown that
the rental value of the building remained unaffected by the changes in
the wall, and that the lessee had the right to change the name so as to indicate its possession of the building.
As noted, the question of waste ultimately hinges on the facts of each
particular case. Thus where the tenant in possession of a boardinghouse
allowed the defendant to paint on a blank wall of the premises a large
sign advertising chewing gum, a decision for plaintiff-owner for damage
to his reversionary interest was affirmed. 41 The defendants cited Riddle v.
Littlefield42 as authority for the right of the tenant in possession to allow
the sign to be painted. The court answered the defendants' contention in
the following manner:
[1]t is therefore plain that the tenant in possession is entitled to the use of the
outside of the walls, just as he is entitled to the use of the inside of the walls, and
can delegate that use to a third person.
But the

. . .

authorities ... clearly establish the rule that the tenant in posses-

sion of the property cannot so use the outer wall as to injure the freehold, nor can
he use them for 48
a purpose inconsistent with the lawful and reasonable enjoyment
of the property.
It was held that since the tenant could give the defendant no authority
to damage the freehold, the jury having found that the painting of the
sign did constitute such damage, the defendant third party was liable to
the plaintiff-owner.
In the light of the cases, it may be taken as established that the tenant
has the right to possession as a part of the demised premises the exterior
89 106 Neb. 294, 183 N.W. 302 (1921).
40 Ibid., at 303. 1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant 271.
41

Kretzer Realty Co. v. Thomas Cusack Co., 196 Mo. App. 596, 190 S.W. 1011 (1916).
N.H. 503, 16 Am. Rep. 688 (1873).
196 Mo. App. 596, 190 S.W. 1011, 1013 (1916).
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of the wall, and that in the absence of agreements against subletting, he
may allow another to use the wall. The only qualification on this right
is that which exists in relation to every part of the leasehold premises,
namely, that the tenant must not injure the landlord's reversionary interest nor commit waste.
TELEVISION ANTENNA CASES

Having discovered that the cases hold that the tenant has the right to
at least the exterior of the walls, it becomes important to consider a group
of cases that have at least indirectly touched upon the question of tenant's rights to adjacent airspace.
Because New York reports more fully than any other jurisdiction, the
opinions of its inferior courts, and because of the countless apartments in
New York City, most of the cases available for consideration are from
that state. However, there appear to be no cases from the court of last
resort in that state bearing on the issue. Since many of the antenna cases
have gone off on questions of pleading or other collateral issues, only
those which come reasonably close to a discussion of the problem of the
right to adjacent airspace will be considered.
One of the first television antenna cases held that the installation of an
antenna on the roof or exterior walls of a building, without first getting
the landlord's consent in writing, was a violation of a lease provision calling for written consent, but did not constitute a violation so substantial
as to warrant eviction. 44 The case appeared to augur well for the rights
of tenants, but the decision must be viewed in the light of the housing
emergency existing in New York at the time. Yet, the language of the
court was certainly favorable to the tenant's position. Witness the following bit of obiter dictum:
The advent of television is an incident in the progress of the times. It is unnecessary to dwell at length upon the comforts, the convenience and the educational vistas which are opened up by this comparatively new device. Suffice it to
say that its presence in many homes is becoming increasingly common with a
rapidity that resembles the acceptance of the radio when sets for home use were
first made and marketed.... Undoubtedly, when telegraph poles were first
erected with the wires stretching across their heights, many people felt that the
sight was an ungainly one and their presence objectionable. 45
Goldstein v. Alweiss, cited several times later in cases favorable to landlords, held in a cryptic and terse opinion that where, without the landlord's permission, the tenant attached a television antenna to the outside
frame of a window in his apartment, "the erection and maintenance of
44 Barfur Realty Corp. v. Kaufman, 83 N.Y.S. 2d 847 (Mun. Ct., N.Y., 1948).
45

Ibid., at 848.
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this structure constitute[d] an unauthorized intrusion or squatting on the
landlord's property within the purview of §1411 of the Civil Practice
4
Act." o

In Ruthann Corp. v. Adler, petitioner sought to recover possession of
the outside portion of one of respondent's living room windows, upon
which an antenna had been installed. 47 It was contended that to the extent to which the arrangement of the bars touched the outside portion of
the tenant's window, there was a squatting or intrusion within the meaning of the statute. Bringing the case under the squatter sections of the
act was a fatal misstep for the petitioner. The court seized upon it to hold
for the tenant, in what was to prove to be the last of the decisions favorable to lessees. Landlords' lawyers in subsequent cases took the hint and
brought their cases under different theories. The court in the Ruthann
opinion noted:
The window in question is the usual rectangular opening in the wall of a building.., the window extends from the outer surface or facade of the building, to
the inner surface of the walls of the tenant's apartment.... Its ordinary, most obvious purpose is to give the tenant immediate access to the easement in light and
air enjoyed by lands in private ownership abutting the public way. To give full
effect to this palpable purpose the tenant must be deemed to have a possessory
right in every part of the window, throughout its length, breadth and depth;
from its inner perimeter to its outer perimeter and all that lies between.48
It was concluded that having come into possession of the entire window frame, for any purpose the tenant could not be regarded as a squatter or intruder in the sense in which the words were used in the statute.
"A squatter is one who settles on the lands of another without any legal
40
authority," the court noted.
Another window frame case, West Holding Corp. v. Cordero, held for
the landlord when he sought an injunction under the theory that the
tenant was guilty of trespass.50 Defendant in that case occupied a sixth
floor apartment in plaintiff's building. Without the plaintiff's permission,
the tenant installed a television antenna consisting of two pipes that extended out of one of the apartment windows. The antenna was attached
to the window frame. The landlord testified on trial that he offered to
grant the tenant permission to install a television aerial on the roof if the
tenant would execute a lease increasing the present rental by fifteen per
cent. The court observed:
46 196 Misc. 513, 93 N.Y.S. 2d 854 (S.Ct., 1949). The antenna in the case was affixed

to the window frame by bolts and extended outwardly away from the building for a
distance of about a foot and a half. The window was located one flight up and directly
above the entrance to the building.
47 197 Misc. 30, 95 N.Y.S. 2d 20 (Mun. Ct., N.Y., 1950).
48
49

Ibid., at 21 (italics added).
Ibid.

50 114 N.Y.S. 2d 668 (S.Ct., 1952).
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The tenant has no legal right, without the landlord's permission, to erect or
attach a television aerial to the frame of a window in his apartment. .. . Equity is
properly invoked to enjoin a continued trespass. The defendant has refused to
remove the television aerial and threatens to continue its installation and use. Under such circumstances the plaintiff is entitled to equitable relief enjoining the
defendant from the continued maintenance and use of such aerial television.51
Of course, where a lease provided that "no plants, rugs, bedding or
anything of any nature whatsoever shall be placed in the window or out
of the same," the court properly enjoined the tenant from maintaining, by
means of a metal bar braced against the window frame, a television an52
tenna projecting out of the window.
As to the right to erect an antenna on a roof, the uniform holding of
the cases is against the tenant. Kanon v. Hefgold Realty Corp. held that
where a television aerial erected by the tenant had been removed by the
landlord because of the absence of written consent as required by the
lease, the tenant could not have a temporary injunction restraining alleged interference with his peaceful enjoyment of the apartment because
to grant the motion would destroy the status quo and grant plaintiff all
the relief he could obtain by a final judgment. 53 In another roof antenna
case, the court required removal of a roof antenna erected by the tenant
of an apartment in a thirty-nine unit building. 54 The lease provided that
the tenant should not "drill into, drive nails.... or place in any manner any
sign, advertisement, illumination, or projection in or out of the windows
or exterior, or from the said building or upon it in anyplace," except as
approved by the landlord. 5 1 The court felt that there was damage to the
reversion by the affixing of eye screws holding the leading line from the
aerial. 56
51 Ibid., at 669.
52 5701 15th Ave. Realty Corp. v. Rosenberg, 94 N.Y.S. 2d 560 (S.Ct., 1949).
53 194 Misc. 54,85 N.Y.S. 2d 581 (S.Ct., 1949).
54 Scroll Realty Corp. v. Mandell, 195 Misc. 972, 92 N.Y.S. 2d 813 (S.Ct., 1949).
55 Ibid., at 814.
56 The problem became so aggravated in New York, that, like so many other sources
of conflict in a large metropolitan area, it became a political football. Several bills relating to antennas were introduced in the 1949 session of the state legislature. Some of
the bills were designed to guarantee every tenant the right to install and maintain an
antenna or equipment necessary for the operation of television sets and forbade additional charges for tenants who had television sets. A. Int. 755; S.Int. 100; S.Int. 1089.
Another group would have declared the installation, operation, and maintenance of
antennas or other apparatus an ordinary incident of the tenancy and sought to make it
a misdemeanor to make an additional rent charge. A. Int. 57; A. Int. 1260; S.Int. 1172.
None of the bills were reported out of committee and one observer called them "demagogic."
In 1950, a bill was introduced in the State Assembly providing that: "Every agreement in or in connection with or collateral to any lease of real property denying the
lessee the right to erect or maintain a radio or television aerial or antenna shall be
deemed void as against public policy and wholly unenforceable, provided that the lessee
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In so far as the courts hold that the tenant has no right to erect aerials
on the roof, they appear to be on solid ground. Although the lease of an
entire building includes the roof, 57 and a lease of a portion of a building

entirely independent of other sections includes the roof,58 where there
is a common roof over premises occupied by several different tenants, the
portion of the roof covering the premises leased to one tenant is not included in the lease.5 9 It has been said that tenants sharing a common roof
have no easements or rights in the roof except for purposes of shelter.60
As for considerations of policy, hear New Jersey Vice Chancellor
Jayne in holding that a tenant had the right to install a television set, but
not the right to erect a twenty-five foot antenna in the rear-yard to
which the lessee had the right to use in common with other tenants: 61
There are casual and incidental rights and interests which sometimes pass to
lessees by implication arising from reasonable needs, conventional uses, or from
other circumstances manifesting the probable intentions of the parties.
No one, I conjecture, has as yet prepared a written lease or contract so copious
and diffuse as to speak its entire piece.
And so, where the nature of the intended basic and principal use of the premises is made perceptible, the rights and privileges which habitually and customarily appertain to and accompany such a use are implied, unless clearly negated.
To the trite expression that death and taxes are certain may also be added as of
equal certainty the changes of the customs of life. Must a lessee now find in his
lease the express permission to install a telephone?
Science has bequeathed to humanity the radio, the juke box, air-conditioning,
and the neon sign, all of which may more commonly and generally than elsewhere be found at modem cafes, restaurants and places for recreation and entertainment. Was it not evident in February last that television sets would be similarly popular and prevalent in such resorts?
That the law should always be harmonious with the contemporaneous standards of knowledge and intelligence is a conviction I do
not care to defy. Sound
62
law is the dictate of reason. Lex est dictamen rationis.

pays or offers to pay to the lessor any increase in insurance premiums resulting from
the installation of such aerial or antenna." A. Int. 16.
All of the proposed bills were assailed as ignoring property rights, increased insurance costs, damage liability to passersby, fire hazards and matters of size regulation. But
they also indicated that the law, as well as nature, abhors a vacuum.
57
Robinson v. Armstrong, 154 Kan. 336, 118 P. 2d 503 (1941).
5sRayhertz Amusement Corp. v. Fulton Improvement Co., 124 N.J. Eq. 121, 200 At.
557 (1938).
5
9 Adler v. Sklaroff, 154 Pa. Super. 444, 36 A. 2d 231 (1944); Liberal Clothing Co. v.
Delson Realty Co., 121 W. Va. 721,6 S.E. 2d 236 (1939).
60 Smelser v. Deutsche Evangelische Lutherische Gemeinde der St. Markus Kirche,
88 Cal. App. 469, 263 Pac. 838 (1928).
61 Bellomo v. Bisanzio, 142 N.J. Eq. 363, 60 A. 2d 64 (1948).
62

Ibid., at 6.
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In addition to the problems of television antennas, the courts have recently been called upon to decide just how far air-conditioners may
project into contiguous airspace. Two lower New York courts have
openly split on the question, not yet settled by the highest court in the
state. In the first case, the court dismissed an action to compel removal of
an air-conditioning unit projecting six inches beyond the window sill, no
part of which touched the outside of the building. 63 The court said that the
principle underlying a squatter proceeding is that the alleged squatter is
unlawfully trespassing upon and remaining in possession of realty. "The
air-conditioning unit in the instant proceeding," the court noted, "has its
physical origin and attachment on the demised premises and is incidental
to the tenant's enjoyment of those premises, and is, therefore, distinguishable from the television antenna cases." 64 Three years later, another court
in the same state, in reversing a final order for the tenant, said simply:
The installation and maintenance by the tenant of an air-conditioning unit
projecting beyond the building wall is an intrusion or squatting upon the landlord's property within the purview of... the Civil Practice Act. In so far as Taft
Constr. Corp. v. Bachnoff65 is to the contrary, we must decline to follow it.66
The television antenna and air-conditioning unit cases presented the
courts with an excellent opportunity to define the rights of the tenant to
the area outside the tangible, physical boundaries of the premises. But, as
should be evident from the foregoing discussion, the problem has received scant attention. This is in part due to the fact that counsel in most
of the cases have been content to argue the cases on other grounds, or
upon broader theories of landlord and tenant which appeared to meet the
exigencies of the varying situations. The courts likewise have been unwilling to examine this problem, the solution of which might have rendered more satisfactory results in some of the cases decided. Dudic Holding Co. v. Reinstein, a masterpiece of terseness and brevity, is typical of
67
the treatment accorded the problem.
Even within the limits of the issues attempted to be settled, the television cases are inconclusive. They hardly define the rights of tenants as
to erection of aerials. With the wall cases as a ready springboard, the
courts might have gone on to settle the problem. As they have not, it is
apparent that only by recurring to the bedrock of landlord and tenant
law can feasible solutions to the question be posited.
03 Taft Constr. Corp. v. Bachnoff, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 898 (Mun. Ct., N.Y., 1950); aff'd
116 N.Y.S. 2d 67 (S.Ct., 1951).
64 Ibid., at 899.
65 Ibid.
66

Dudic Holding Corp. v. Reinstein, 205 Misc. 42, 129 N.Y.S. 2d 401 (S.Ct., 1953).
67bid.
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POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND GENERAL THEORIES

Textwriters, theorists and courts have been generous in their statement
of the tenant's rights. Most of the pronouncements have been so broad
that the rights, unless "limited by the neighborhood of principles of
policy," which are other than those upon which the particular rights are
founded, "tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme."' 8
Yet these general statements have value in that they indicate certain policies in the law which have become maximatic in statement, if not in application from case to case.
Taylor declares that a tenant is entitled to the use of "all those privileges, easements, and appurtenances in any way belonging to the premises
under lease, as incident to his grant," unless the landlord restricts the
rights by stipulation.6 9 In another passage in his treatise, he states:
In general, the grant of a thing passes the incident as well as the principal,
though the latter only is mentioned, unless there appears an express reservation.
Thus, the lease of70a building passes everything belonging to it which is essential
to its enjoyment.
It could hardly be contended, it would seem, that a tenant could lease
an entire building and not have the right to extend into the column of
airspace surrounding the building, various mechanical or structural projections necessary for the reasonable enjoyment and use of the building.
The conclusion, however, is not so readily drawn where the tenant leases
a relatively small space in a building, along with several other tenants.
Questions of practicality press the rule at every point, competing interests
71
forcing and compelling compromise at every turn.
However, Taylor's statement of the principle seems to be in accordance with the common-law rule, stated by the Supreme Court of Alabama in Senteney v. United Embroidery Co. 72 There, authority was cited
in the jurisdiction to the effect that lessees have by implication, the right
to "possess and enjoy" the premises and "to put it to such use and enjoyment as they please," not materially different from that in which it is
usually employed, "to which it is adapted, and for which it was con7
structed." '
68 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holmes.
69 Taylor, Landlord and Tenant (9th ed.), 275.
70 Ibid., at 192.
71 In Adler v. Sklaroff, 154 Pa. Super. 444, 36 A. 2d 231, 233 (1944), the court states:
"[W]here a landlord leases different parts of a building to different tenants he remains
in control of those portions not specifically leased, and as to such portions he retains
the responsibilities of a general owner."
72 230 Ala. 53, 159 So. 252 (1935).
73 Ibid., at 255.
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In Weiland v. American Stores Co., 74 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, holding that a tenant was not liable for injuries due to a defective sidewalk, quoted with approval from a learned textwriter to the following effect:
The lease of a part of a building carries with it for the benefit of the tenant
everything which is necessarily used with or which is reasonably necessary to
the enjoyment of the particular portion which he occupies.... Under the general rule that those rights essential to the enjoyment of the demised premises,
and necessary for the enjoyment thereof, pass as appurtenant thereto, the rights
egress pass to the tenant even though they are not specifically
of ingress and
mentioned. 75
The California courts likewise have been liberal in their definitions of
tenant rights. In Bellon v. Silver Gate Theaters, a state appellate court,
holding that whether a basement was part of the demised premises where
a store above was leased to the tenant was a question of fact for the jury,
said that a lease of a part of a building passes with it everything "necessarily used with or reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the part
76
demised."
In Jackson v. Birgfeld, a Maryland court said that in determining what
constitutes the premises, the court, after considering the language of the
instrument itself, considers the nature of the building and surrounding
property and the general purposes of the parties. 77 The court regarded
as settled that a deed, absent qualifications, passes to the grantee everything reasonably necessary to the full beneficial use and enjoyment of the
property. "This principle," the court declared, "is equally applicable to
78
a lease."
Similar considerations as to reasonable use and enjoyment have been
involved in construing the word "appurtenance." In an Illinois decision,
the court held that a lease of rooms on the third floor of a building could
by no reasonable interpretation include as an appurtenance a storage
74 346 Pa.253, 29 A. 2d 484 (1943).
75 Ibid., at 485. Trickett, Landlord and Tenant (2d ed.), 47, 48. In Martel v. Malone,

138 Conn. 385, 85 A. 2d 246, 249 (1951), citing language in Arpile v. Colonial Trust Co.,
118 Conn. 573, 579, 173 Atl. 237, 239 (1934), the court states: "'In the absence of an
agreement, expressed or implied, the tenant of an apartment acquires an exclusive right
of occupancy and control of that apartment, and as incidental thereto of those parts of
the structure which form an integral part of the tenement. 1 Underhill, Landlord and
Tenant § 3.'" The court held that the landlord was responsible only for structural defects as the tenant has no exclusive control of them. Thus it was held that the landlord
would be liable for structural defects in beams supporting a floor but not for defects
in the floorboards.
764 Cal. 2d 1, 47 P. 2d 462, 467 (1935). See Owsley v. Hamner, 83 Cal. App. 2d 454,
189 P. 2d 50 (1948).
77 189 Md. 552, 56 A. 2d 793 (1948).
78 Ibid., at 795.
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space in the basement of the building, entirely apart from space designated in the lease itself.79 The court stated that nothing passes by the
word appurtenance except "incorporeal easements, or rights, or privileges,
strictly necessary and essential to the proper enjoyment of the estate
granted."' 0 Mere convenience, said the court, will not create an easement.

81

How courts balance some of the conflicting claims of right is amply
illustrated by O'wsley v. Hanmer.82 The central point of controversy
there was whether a lease signed prior to the completion of a building
constructed around a central patio, restricted the lessor from closing up
one of the street openings into the patio, converting it from a thoroughfare between two streets into a narrow cul de sac. The net effect of the
conversion was to interfere with the light, air, visibility and access of
passersby to the tenant's display windows.
After paying the customary homage to the rule that a "lease of part of
a building passes with it, as an incident thereto, everything necessarily
83
used with or reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the part demised,1
the court reversed and ordered a new trial upon appeal by both parties,
holding that in view of the importance of the patio, the fact that there
was nothing in the lease as to the right of the landlord to close it off made
it mandatory that oral evidence offered to show the intention of the parties be admitted. It was said that whether considered as an easement, or
consideration of a contract, or an incorporeal right, the lessee is entitled to "all of that for which he contracted" at the time the lease was
entered into. Thus the intent of the parties with regard to the patio be84
came all important.
It may be regarded as settled that a tenant may acquire a right to light
79 Harmony Cafeteria Co. v. International Supply Co., 249 II. App. 532 (1928).
80 Ibid.

81 The word "appurtenance" has undergone a process of deterioration as a concept
of importance. In Riddle v. Littlefield, 53 N.H. 503, 508, 16 Am. Rep. 688 (1873), it is
said: "These distinctions are refined, and in the common practice of modem conveyancing are not much regarded,-the term appurtenances, in a vast majority of cases in
deeds and leases, having, in fact, I presume, no meaning whatever in the minds of the
contracting parties, who append the unnecessary formula by force of the custom and
example which has for so long a time applied it to grants and leases of a principal thing,
to which no inferior easement or servitude whatever, in fact, belongs."
82 83 Cal. App. 2d 454, 189 P. 2d 50 (1948).
88 Ibid., at 52.
84 The trial court in the instant case found that it was the manifest intention and
agreement of the lessor and lessee that the lessee should have occupancy of the interior
areas described in the lease (the patio) and the right to have it kept open for free access
by the lessee's customers. Curiously enough, however, the trial court concluded that
there was nothing in the lease which required the landlord to keep the building as it
was originally constructed.
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and air from an open space owned by the lessor which is necessary to the
beneficial enjoyment of the premises demised, even though there be no
express agreement to that effect between lessor and lessee.
Some of the cases, even at an early time, have said that a lease, expressing nothing as to the way in which premises are to be used, clothes the
lessee with full power and right to use the land in the same manner that
the owner might have used it, subject to the usual qualification as to dam5
age to the reversion. The cases are legion as to this point.8 Courts have
continually held that the lessee stands in the position of an owner in fee
with regards to rights of use,8 6 except that the lessee may not commit
waste, and thus where the lessor draws the lease, ambiguities will be
drawn against him most stringently. 7 The Draconian possibilities of such
a doctrine are plain, yet the courts have not, as a statement of principle,
seen fit to narrow it. Treating the lessee as the owner of a possessory estate, the courts have continually said that the lessor may be sued in trespass for unlawful entry,88 or in ejectment where the tenant has been
evicted, or possession has not been delivered to the lessee.8 9
In short, the holding of the courts has been that while the lease is in
force, the tenant is the absolute owner of the premises and the landlord
has only a reversionary interest. Textwriters have assented in this proposition, Taylor stating:
Upon taking possession the tenant is invested with all the rights incident to
possession and to the use of all the privileges and easements appurtenant to the
tenement. He may maintain an action against any person who disturbs his possession or trespasses upon the premises though it be the landlord himself .... 90
Under the existing principles of landlord and tenant, it would be cautious in the extreme to declare that a tenant's rights do not extend beyond
the exterior of the wall bounding the premises, where an extension would
be necessary for the beneficial enjoyment of the premises. Of course, there
are competing claims of right where there are several tenants, as in an
office or apartment building, but this would seem to call for a balancing
of the rights as between the tenants, instead of a restriction of the tenants
rights vis-d-vis the landlord. In view of the fact that the language of the
85 U.S. v. Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53 (1877); Asling v. McAllister-Fitzgerald Lumber Co.,
120 Kan. 455, 244 Pac. 16 (1926).
s 6Columbia R. Gas & E. Co. v. Jones, 119 S.C. 480, 112 S.E. 267 (1922); Stern v.
Sawyer, 78 Vt. 5, 61 Ad. 36 (1905).
87 Grassham v. Robertson, 277 Ky. 605, 126 S.W. 2d 1063 (1939); Carbon Fuel Co. v.
Gregory, 131 W. Va. 494, 48 S.E. 2d 338 (1948).
88 Stanton v. Tapp., 113 Md. 324, 77 Ad. 672 (1910); Winchester v. O'Brien, 266 Mass.
33, 164 N.E. 807 (1929).
89 Walker v. Clifford, 128 Ala. 67, 29 So. 588 (1900).
9
o Taylor, Landlord and Tenant (9th ed.), 228.
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courts has been anything but restrictive of tenant's rights, it becomes difficult to reconcile the holdings in the New York television antenna cases
with the principles enunciated in other decisions.
Because of the intangible nature of rights to airspace, the theorist treads
on thin ground in attempting to define spatial limitations that may, in some
instances, defy limitation, or be inherently incapable of precise delineation.9 1 However, there is some degree of comfort in Whitehead's remark that success in practice depends on "theorists who, led by other
motives of exploration, have been there before, and by some good chance
'92
have hit upon the relevant ideas."
CONTIGUOUS

LAND, CONTIGUOUS

AIRSPACE

While an examination of so-called settled concepts provides an indication as to the path the courts may follow, there is one rule that, if applied by analogy, lends great weight to the tenant's right to reasonable use
of the airspace outside the walls of the premises demised.
That rule is that a lease of an entire building, or the grant in fee of a
building, carries with it "so much of the lot on which the building stands
as is necessary to the complete enjoyment of the building for the purpose
for which it was leased. 903 If this principle applies to the lease of an entire
building, why not to the lease of an entire floor, and if to the lease of an
entire floor, why not to a lease of an apartment or room? As the lot surrounding the building may be necessary to its complete enjoyment, similarly, the column of airspace surrounding it may be indispensable to reasonable and full use of the demised premises.
In McDaniel v. Willer, a recent case, there was a lease of a "General
Merchandise store Building and Fixtures therein-The Store building is
located in Village of Coffman, County of Ste. Genevieve, State of
Mo ....-94 The controversy was over admissibility of evidence tending to

show that the parties by their actual agreement, had not intended to limit
the property demised to the store building itself as appeared on the face of
the lease, but on the contrary had intended and agreed that the leasehold
91 Note, for instance, the difficulty courts have had in reconciling the maxim, Cujus
est solum ejus est usque ad coelum, Shep. Touch. 90, with the right of free navigation

of the skies. U.S. v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946), is a relatively recent and controversial

decision in this regard.
9
2 Whitehead, The Aims of Education (Mentor ed., 1952), 107.
93 Jackson v. Birgfeld, 189 Md. 552, 56 A. 2d 793, 795 (1948). Whether land in the
rear of a building is necessary to its complete enjoyment is a question for the jury depending upon the facts of the case, the court ruled. Note Sheets v. Selden, 2 Wall. 177,
17 L.ed. 822, 826 (1865), where it is said that a deed, in the absence of any language indicating a contrary intention of the grantor, passes to the grantee everything that is properly appurtenant to the land conveyed, i.e., everything essential or reasonably necessary
to the full beneficial use and enjoyment of the property.
94 216 S.W. 2d 144 (Mo. App., 1948).
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estate should embrace land immediately to the rear of the store upon
which was situated an old barn, previously used for storage by the last
proprietor of the store. Holding that the lease was ambiguous and that
parol evidence was admissable to clear up the ambiguities, the court said:
The authorities are agreed that where, as in this instance, a lease purports on
its face to be no more than the lease of an entire building, and contains no refer-

ence to the land, it will be none the less construed as carrying with it the
lease, not only the land upon which the building actually stands, but also such
adjacent land belonging to the lessor as may be used with the building or may
be necessary to its proper occupation for the purpose for which it was intended. 95

The court labeled as "arbitrary" an attempt by the landlord to restrict
the leasehold estate to the lot on which the building was situated where
the language of the lease "would comprehend whatever of his land might
be shown to be incident to the complete enjoyment of the building."9 6
In view of the law's generosity with the landlord's land, why should it
be less liberal with his airspace? An Illinois decision held that "[u]nder the
recognized rules of construction, where property is leased by street number, the lease will include ... the lot upon which the building itself is situated. '97 In the Massachusetts case of Ansin v. Taylor, it was held that ordinarily a grant of a house carries with it title to all the land under the
house, including that under projecting eaves. 9s In Patterson v. Graham,
it was held that where a lease does not in terms convey any right to a passageway to buildings in the rear of that leased, or any right to such buildings in the rear, the lease conveys so much of the lot on which the buildings stand as may be necessary to the complete enjoyment of the leased
building for the purpose for which it is rented. 99
The Illinois Supreme court has said in an early case that the grant of a
steam elevator carries with it, as part of the grant, land upon which the
elevator is located and all that is necessarily used in connection therewith.10 The court cited Tinker v. City of Rockford' 1' as authority for
the proposition that when property is granted, whatever is necessary to
the enjoyment of the grant is impliedly conveyed as an incident thereto.
Thus, even though the mortgage conveying the elevator was upon a chattel mortgage form, it was held that the land on which the elevator was sit95 Ibid., at 144.
96 Ibid.
97 Killian v. Welfare Engineering Co., 328 Il1. App. 375, 387, 66 N.E. 2d 305, 311
(1946). Even where the deed conveyed the "building situated on lot number _," it
was held that the deed passed ten adjoining feet of another lot also occupied by the
building. Wilson v. Hunter, 14 Wisc. 744,80 Am. Dec. 795 (1861). Cf. Gibson v. Brockway, 8 N.H. 465, 31 Am. Dec. 200 (1837); Dikeman v. Taylor, 24 Conn. 219 (1855).
98262 Mass. 159, 159 N.E. 513 (1928).
99 140 111. 531, 30 N.E. 460 (1892).
100 Cross v. Weare Commission Co., 153 I11.499, 38 N.E. 1038 (1894),
101 137 11. 123, 28 N.E. 573 (1894).
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uated passed with the grant of the elevator. Likewise, the Alabama court
of last resort has held that a mortgage on a grist and saw mill and gin,
"together with all the privileges and appurtenances belonging thereto,"
included two acres of land upon which the mill and gin were located, and
which had always been used in connection therewith and were thus "ne10 2
cessary to the enjoyment thereof.'
Finally, to adduce one extreme example, perhaps looking the other way
as far as tenant's rights are concerned, there is the Leiferman v. Ostein
case.' 0 3 There, the landlord actually moved the building in which the
tenant had rented a floor, to an adjoining lot. The court ruled that the
tenant could have treated the removal as an eviction only by leaving, but
that since he remained, there was no eviction. The court said that by renting part of a building, the tenant acquired only support rights and enjoyment of easements, but no estate in the land itself. Therefore, the tenant
was only disturbed in the enjoyment of an easement, the court reasoned.
This could constitute eviction only if treated as such by going out. Judgment for the landlord in the action of forcible entry and detainer was sustained. It is enough to say that the case is restrictive of the tenant's rights
and is productive of a result more in keeping with the refinements of eviction law than with the underlying principles of landlord and tenant.
Nevertheless, it is settled that a lease of a building passes the land upon
which the building stands for the duration of the lease, and in some cases
may pass land contiguous or incident thereto necessary to the ordinary use
and enjoyment of such building. It would, then, be obviously inconsistent
to deny the lessee of an entire building necessary adjacent airspace, and
yet grant him necessary adjacent land. And there are no cases so holding.
Whether or not a lessee of a floor of a building, or of a room, has the
right to make use of adjacent airspace necessary for the full enjoyment
of the floor or room is not so obvious. However, consistency would require that such right be recognized.
CONCLUSION

Mr. Justice Holmes has pointed out that in law, only occasionally can
an "absolutely final and quantitative determination" be reached, because
as he says, "the worth of the competing social ends which respectively
elicit a judgment for the plaintiff or the defendant cannot be reduced to
10 4
number and accurately fixed.'
There are few places in the law where his observation has greater validity than in assessing the rights of tenants in relation to other tenants and
02

Kimbrell v. Rogers, 90 Ala. 339, 7 So. 241 (1890). Accord: Rogers v. Snow, 118
Mass. 118 (1875); Trinity Church v. Boston, 118 Mass. 164 (1875).
103 64 Ill. App. 578, 47 N.E. 203 (1896).
1

104 Law in Science and Science in Law, Collected Legal Papers, 231 (1921).
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in relation to the rights of the landlord. No doubt many of the decisions
in the future in this regard will be "the unconscious result of instinctive
preferences and inarticulate convictions ... traceable to views of public
policy in the last analysis."'10 5
Yet is is possible to draw certain tentative conclusions. The courts have
early and consistently held that the circle of the tenant's rights is great in
circumference. They have not hesitated in giving him something like unbridled dominion over the exterior of the walls. Where an entire building
has been leased, they have held that the lessee also takes by the lease necessary contiguous land. It is then but a short step to hold that the lessee
of a floor, or of a room, has not only possession of the exterior of the
walls, but also possession and the right to use adjacent airspace essential
to the enjoyment of the lease.
But admittedly, the law here, as elsewhere, is unsettled, indeed undecided. Additional decisions will be needed to more fully clarify the rights
of both landlords and tenants as technological advances continue to create
new difficulties for lawyers and laymen alike. There is, then, reassurance
in the words of Cardozo:
There are topics where the law is still uninformed and void. Some hint or premonition of coming shapes and moulds, it betrays amid the flux, yet it is so
amorphous, so indeterminate, that formulation, if attempted would be the prophecy of what is to be rather than the statement of what is .... [Wlith all our
centuries of common law development, with all our multitudinous decisions,
there are so many questions, elementary in the sense of being primary and basic,
that remain unsettled even now.... What is certain is that the gaps in the system
will be filled, and filled with ever-growing consciousness of the process by a
balancing of social interests, an estimate of social values, a reading of the social
mind.106
105 Ibid.
106 Paradoxes of Legal Science, 76 (1928).
COMMENTING UPON FAILURE OF ACCUSED
TO TESTIFY
At common law, the defendant was incompetent to testify in a criminal
proceeding." As a result of such incompetency, comment by the prosecution concerning the failure of the accused to testify was of no importance.
Historically, therefore, the problem of whether the prosecution can effectively comment upon the failure of the accused to take the witness
stand was created by the enactment of the statutes which relieved the ac2
cused of his incapacity to testify.
Some of these statutes contained express clauses that no presumption
12 Wigmore, Evidence S 579 (3d ed., 1940).
2 State v. Ferguson, 222 Iowa 1148, 283 N.W. 917 (1939). For a list of the statutory

enactments, see Reeder, Comment Upon Failure of Accused to Testify, 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 40, 41, 42 (1932).

